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The United States Dropped the Atomic
Bomb of Article 16 of the ICC Statute:
Security Council Power of Deferrals
and Resolution 1422
Mohamed El Zeidy*
ABSTRACT

This Article discusses the recent adoption of the Security
Council Resolution 1422 and its impact on international law.
The Author asserts that the United States--a major proponent
of Resolution 1422-desires to immunize its leaders and soldiers
from the International Criminal Court's jurisdictionalpowers.
The Author begins by describing the drafting history of Article
16 and its legal consequences. Upon highlighting the most
significant reasons for opposing Resolution 1422, the Author
delineates how the Resolution mirrorsthe inconsistency with the
United Nations Charter and the Law of Treaties. Finally, the
Author concludes that Resolution 1422 should be rejected
because it violates certain peremptory norms and it conflicts
with the letter and the spirit of existing internationallaws.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On July 12, 2002 the Security Council (Council) adopted
Resolution 1422, which is based on Article 16 of the International
Criminal Court Statute (ICC Statute). For a renewable period of
twelve months, the Resolution grants the Council authority to stop
the commencement or continuation of a criminal investigation or
prosecution.
Interpreters of Resolution 1422 have used different constructions
to analyze the Resolution's meaning and its ramifications. One
dominant theory posits that the adoption of Resolution 1422
delineates the Council's intent to augment its powers by amending
the International Criminal Court Treaty. Thus, critics have urged
against its adoption because the Resolution contradicts the letter and
the spirit of existing international laws.
This Article sheds light on the essence of Resolution 1422 by
challenging its legality and measuring its compatibility with different
principles of international law. Part II describes why the United
States supported the adoption of Resolution 1422 in light of the ICC's
jurisdictional powers under Article 16 of the ICC Statute. Part III
highlights drafting history and the legal consequences of Article 16.
Part IV then examines the most significant statements made by
formal and informal state representatives, which reflect their
unanimous opposition to the Resolution's adoption. Part V discusses
Resolution 1422's effect on the U.N. Charter and the Law of Treaties
by describing how the Resolution mirrors the inconsistency with the
two laws and the dangerous consequences resulting from such
inconsistency. Part VI advocates for the invalidation of Resolution
1422, via the use of peremptory norms, because the Resolution
violates those norms. Finally, Part VII examines, inter alia, the
different possibilities of interpretation of the Resolution and
concludes that the language of the Resolution is contradictory and,
because of its misformulation, there may be practical problems in its
application.
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II.BACKGROUND
On July 12, 2002, the Security Council passed a dangerous
resolution that paralyzed the International Criminal Court's (ICC)
jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers participating in the peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 The original draft resolution
intended to protect only the U.S. forces. Yet, due to international
criticism against the United States, the Council adopted the current
resolution protecting not only U.S. soldiers, but all non-member
2
countries of the Rome Treaty from lawsuits under the ICC Statute.
At the outset, the United States requested that the Security
Council grant immunity to U.S. soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina
from the ICC's jurisdiction for one year. 3 If the Council would not
accept the proposal, then the United States threatened to use its veto
power to stop the renewal of the period of their mission in BosniaHerzegovina, which was to expire on July 15, 2002. 4 Even after
extensive debates regarding the ICC's jurisdiction over peacekeeping
forces from non-party states, the Council nonetheless adopted
5
Resolution 1422.
Resolution 1422 exempts "current or former officials or personnel
from a contributing [non-party State] to the Rome Statute" from

1.
See S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4572d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1422 (2002) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1422].
2.
Hua Jiang, Highlights of the Noon Briefing, at http://www.un.orglNews/
ossgfhilites.htm. In his meeting with the Nigerian President, the U.N. Secretary
General issued the following statement regarding the above-mentioned dispute: the
Resolution "resolves the conflict in the sense that the Americans themselves backed
away from the blanket immunity they were asking for American Soldiers and
American Personnel .... " He further added that "it is also taking away the potential
conflict that would have ended the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and perhaps
in other locations." Id.
3.
See President's Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Continued
Operations of United States Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 38 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1243 (July 29, 2002); Alaa Reyad, The US Proposed a One Year Immunity
for Its Soldiers To Rescue Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia From the Veto Power, AL AHRAM WEEKLY, July 12, 2002, at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg.
4.
Id. See also Jiang, supra note 2. On June 30, 2002 the Security Council
adopted a technical, "rollover resolution" to extend United Nations Mission In Bosnia
and Herzegovina's (UNMIBH) mandate for three days after the United States had
vetoed a proposed text that would have renewed their Mission until Dec. 31, 2002. S.C.
Res. 1420, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4564th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1420 (2002)
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 1420]. However, following that action, the Council agreed to
extend the deadline for three days. On July 3, 2002, the latter adopted another
technical text extending the Mission until July 15, 2002. S.C. Res. 1421, U.N. SCOR,
57th Sess., 4566th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1421 (2002) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1421].
In this respect, see S.C. Res. 1423, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4573d mtg, at 1, U.N. DOC.
S/RES/1423 (2002) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1423].
5.
S.C. Res. 1422, supra note 1.
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standing trial before the ICC for a renewable one-year period
beginning July 1, 2002.6 The language of the Resolution impedes the
ICC prosecutor 7 from commencing or continuing an investigation, or
prosecuting troops whenever any "case arises" pursuant to Articles 6,
8
7, and 8 of the ICC Statute.
Upon the ICC Statute's enactment on July 1, 2002, the United
States chose not to gamble with its soldiers by silently remaining as
an observer. Under Article 12(2)(a) of the ICC Statute, U.S. soldiers
were required to stand trial before the ICC 9 even though the United
0
Ambassador David
States was not a party to the Rome Treaty.1

Id. para. 2. It is argued that the Resolution would not be limited to those
6.
actually undertaken by the United Nations, but would also include those approved by
the United Nations, such as the NATO mission in Afghanistan. This classification is
very dangerous and places an entire group of individuals above the rule of
international law. In addition, a further imminent danger could arise-namely, any
U.S. attack on Iraq. If such an attack took place, one could argue that the United
States could still invoke Resolution 1422 to protect its soldiers. This could be based on
the early Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq in addition to the wording of
Paragraph 1 of the current resolution.
See id.
7.
8.

ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, July 17, 1998,

arts. 6-8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (establishing, by treaty, an international criminal
court with the power to investigate and prosecute acts of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression) [hereinafter ICC Statute].
ICC Statute, supra note 8, art. 12(2)(a) (stipulating that, ."In the case of
9.
article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of
the following States are Parties to this Statute ... a) The State on the territory of
which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a
vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft."). Thus, based on
the principle of territoriality, the United States feared that the Court could exercise its
jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers involved in the UNMIBH because Bosnia and
Herzegovina is currently a State Party to the iCC Statute. Accordingly, either the
State Party could refer a case to the prosecutor or the prosecutor acting proprio motu
could exercise power over nationals of non-Party States by virtue of Article 12(2)(a) of
the Statute. In this respect, see the statement made by Ambasador David Scheffer
during the drafting negotiations, whose government favored the consent regime. He
said,
There is a reality and the reality is that the United States is a global military
power and presence. Other countries are not. We are. Our military forces are
often called upon to engage overseas in conflict situations, for purposes of
humanitarian intervention, to rescue hostages, to bring out American citizens
from threatening environments, to deal with terrorists. We have to be
extremely careful that this proposal does not limit the capacity of our armed
forces to the legitimately operate internationally. We have to be careful that it
does not open up opportunities for endless frivolous complaints to be lodged
against the United States as a global military power.
Daniel Nsereko, The InternationalCriminal Court: Jurisdictionaland Related Issues,
10 CRIM. L.F. 87, 104-05 (1999).

10.

Sharon A. Williams, Article 12: Preconditionsto the Exercise of Jurisdiction,

in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVERS' NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 340 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) [hereinafter
See also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE].
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Scheffer, who led the U.S. delegation in Rome, also recognized this
danger, and thus, stated:
[A]rticle 12 of the ICC treaty reduces the need for ratification of the
treaty by national governments by providing the court with jurisdiction
over the nationals of a non-party state, Under Article 12, the ICC may
exercise such jurisdiction over any one any where in the world . . . if
either the state of the territory where the crime was committed or the
state of nationality of the accused consents . . . [hence] the treaty
exposes non-parties...11

Accordingly, the ICC prosecutor has the power to initiate
investigations proprio motu 12 under two main circumstances: (1)
based on information about criminal activities within the ]ICC's
jurisdiction, 13 or (2) based on a state report, in accordance with
Article 14, that "a situation in which" a crime enumerated in Article 5
was committed. 14 Although the prosecutor had neither initiated an
investigation on a particular country nor taken any positive
movement resulting from any information that might have been
received, the United States invoked the deferral provision under
Article 16 of the ICC Statute. 15 The U.S.'s preventive measures
16
angered the international community.
Past statements made by U.S. representatives reveal that
Resolution 1422 was an obvious step toward thwarting the ICC's
powers. For example, Ambassador Scheffer stated:
[I] regret to report that certain [U.S.] objectives were not achieved and
[T]he Rome
therefore we could not support the draft that emerged ....
Treaty will become the single most effective brake on international and
regional peacekeeping in the 21st century.... [The] fundamental flaws
in the Rome Treaty mean that the United States will not sign the

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ITS ESTABLISHMENT, THE STATUTE, A STUDY OF THE
HISTORICAL PRESPECTIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMISSIONS & THE
FORMER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 150 (2001). See generally Sharon A.
Williams, The Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court: From 1947-2000 and
Beyond, 38 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 298 (2000); Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction
Over the Nationals of Non-Party States: A Critique of the U.S. Position, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2000).
11.
David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court,
93 AM. J. INT'L L. 12, 18 (1999).
ICC Statute, supra note 8, arts. 13(c), 150).
12.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. arts. 13(a), 14(1).
Id. art. 16.
15.
16.
See Statement of Richard Dicker, Director of Human Rights Watch's
International Justice Program, July 12, 2002, at http://www.hrw.org. ("We are not
happy that the U.S. has squeezed out a purported deferral of prosecution for
peacekeepers . . . no group of people should be even temporarily beyond the reach of
international justice.").

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:1503

present text of the treaty, nor is there any prospect of signing the
17
existing text in the future.

Ambassador Scheffer's remarks clearly signal that the United States
opposed the Rome Treaty. Moreover, his statements reflect U.S.
concerns regarding the role of its peacekeeping soldiers in current or
future missions. Though the United States signed the Rome Treaty
on December 31, 2000, its purpose, as expressed by former President
Clinton, was "to be in a position to influence the evolution of the
court."'1 8 While participating and negotiating at the ICC Preparatory
Commission's Sessions, the United States aimed to insulate itself
from the effects of the Rome Treaty. 19 In fact, the U.S. delegation
"pushed for Elements of Crimes that narrowed the scope of the ICC
Statute, and it lobbied in vain for a provision that would place U.S.
nationals out of the reach of the court. 20
Though some of the U.S.'s concerns have been assuaged, some
21
commentators argue that "the most significant ones were not."
Arguably, the ICC's jurisdictional regime did not adequately protect
U.S. troops if the United States were to become a party to the Rome
Treaty. 22 The ICC claims jurisdiction over non-party nationals as
23
well.
Including a crime of aggression in the Rome Treaty's final text
both surprised and disappointed the United States because some of
the delegates desired to define the crime without requiring a
consistent Council determination. 24 The United States felt that
proponents of the ICC had an inherent goal to restrain U.S. forces. 25
When unable to influence U.S. foreign policy directly, an alternative
method was to indirectly impact policy by targeting the policymakers
themselves.2 6 "An overzealous prosecutor who disagrees with U.S.
27
policies could bring U.S. military personnel before the court.

17.
William K. Lietzau, International Criminal Law After Rome: Concerns
From a U.S. Military Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 125 (2001).
Diane Amann, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S.
18.
National Reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section IV
The United States of America and the InternationalCriminal Court, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
381, 381 (2002).
David Scheffer, Staying the Course With the International Criminal Court,
19.
35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 47, 66-67 (2001).
20.
Amann, supra note 18, at 383.
21.
Lietzau, supra note 17, at 124.
Id. at 125. See also Amann, supra note 18, at 387.
22.
Lietzau, supra note 17, at 125.
23.
Id.; Amann, supra note 18, at 389.
24.
25.
Lietzau, supra note 17, at 126-27.
Id.
26.
27.
Roseanne Latore, Escape Out the Back Door or Charge in the Front Door:
The U.S. Reactions To the International Criminal Court, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
159, 160 (2002).
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Concerns about the overarching powers of the ICC 28 induced the
United States to act in two ways: (1) withdraw its signature fron the
Rome Treaty, and (2) adopt Resolution 1422.

III.

ARTICLE

16

A. Drafting History
Article 16 may be considered one of the most dangerous and
sensitive provisions in the ICC Statute.
The Article governs
situations regarding deferrals by the Council, and it is deemed to
negatively frustrate the ICC's powers.2 9 Article 16 also deters the
establishment of an independent and impartial jurisdictional
mechanism. 30
Nevertheless, the drafting history of Article 16
demonstrates that some of its drafters intended to reduce the
Council's powers through the provision itself. Thus, Article 16 is a
product of many compromises and is better than the initial
International Law Commission's (ILC) proposal where the ICC was
slated to be dependant upon the Council and subordinate to its
action.
Article 23(3) of the 1994 ILC Draft states in part:
"No
prosecution may be commenced under this Statute arising from a
situation which is being dealt with by the Security Council as a
threat to or a breach of the peace or an act of aggression under
Chapter VII of the Charter, unless the Security Council otherwise
decides. 31 Article 23(3) provides that a prosecution arising from a
situation "being dealt with" by the Security Council under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter may not be intiated unless the Council itself

28.
For a thorough discussion regarding all U.S. concerns, see generally
Amann, supra note 18; Bruce Broomhall, The United States & The International
Criminal Court: Toward U.S. Acceptance of the International Criminal Court, 64 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (2001); Latore, supra note 27; Lietzau, supra note 17; John
Seguin, Denouncing the International Criminal Court: An Examination of U.S.
Objections to the Rome Statute, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 85 (2000); Scheffer, supra note 19;
Amann, supra note 18. Inevitably, one might argue that the U.S. withdrawal of its
signature mirrors a prima facie case that it was planning to act contrary to Article 18
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, thus, such withdrawal was a
significant step for the U.S. to take in order to overcome the inconsistency with the
Law of Treaties. Neverthless, adopting Resolution 1422 in such a manner placed the
United States in a situation to be in violation not only to the Law of Treaties but also
the U.N. Charter and other norms under international law as seen below.
29.
See ICC Statute, supra note 8, art. 16.
30.
See id.
31.
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court Prepared by the
International Law Commission, in Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the
Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 84, U.N. Doc.
A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft Statute].
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provides its authorization.3 2 The provision also recognizes the
priority of the Council's action in sustaining peace and security, as
well as the need to coordinate activities between the Council and the
ICC.33
Many delegates opposed Article 23(3) of the ILC Draft on various
grounds, including the possibility that the Council may disrupt the
ICC's ability to function independently.3 4 The ICC may be deprived
of its jurisdiction in a particular situation if the situation remains
35
under the Council's consideration for an indefinite period of time.
One veto by a permanent Council member can sufficiently thwart or
makes the ICC vulnerable to the
block the ICC from action, which
36
motivations.
political
Council's
The search for a compromise between the ICC and the Council's
37
During
powers coalesced around the "Singapore Compromise."
an
proposed
PrepCom's August 1997 session, Singapore formally
and
ICC
amendment revising the relationship structure between the
the Council.38 Singapore's proposal became the basis for the second
39
option in Article 23(3) in the ILC Draft.
Singapore's proposal states, "[no investigation or prosecution
may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute where the
Security Council has acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, given a direction to that effect. '40 The Singapore
Compromise proposes the opposite of what was required by Article
23(3) of the ILC Draft. 41 Thus, ICC proceedings may continue unless
the Council formally decides to stop the process. 4 2 Since the adoption
of a Security Council decision requires a minimum of nine affirmative
may only be blocked by a
votes in the Council, the ICC's proceedings
"concerted effort" of the Council members. 4 3

32.
33.

'

Id.
Pietro Gargiulo, The Controversial Relationship Between the International

Criminal Court and the Security Council, in 1 ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 86 (William Schabas et al. eds., 1999).

34.

Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and the Security Council:

Articles 13(b) and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 150 (Roy Lee ed., 1999).

35.
36.

Id.
Morten

Bergsmo et al., Deferral of Investigation or Prosecution, in

COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 10, at 377.

The "Singapore Compromise" is now embodied in Article 16 of the ICC
37.
Statute. ICC Statute, supra note 8, art. 16. See also Brian Keatts, The International
Criminal Court: Far From Perfect, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 137, 149 (2000).

The structure of the relationship was provided by the 1994 ILC Draft
38.
Statute. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 31.
Id. art. 23(3).
39.
Bergsmo et al., supra note 36, at 375.
40.
1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 31, art. 23(3).
41.
Bergsmo et al., supra note 36, at 375.
42.
Yee, supra note 34, at 150.
43.
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Theoretically, an ICC proceeding cannot be impeded even if all
five permanent Council members joined to block the proceeding; nine
positive votes are required to inhibit the block, including those from
Based on Singapore's proposal, a
the five permanent members. 44
"negative veto" by the ILC text would be replaced by a positive vote. 45
its jurisdiction unless it is
Consequently, the ICC can exercise
46
directed not to do so by the Council.
In addition to the terms of the Singapore proposal, Canada
recommended a 12-month renewable deferral period. 47 Costa Rica
also suggested that deferral requests be made by a "formal and
specific decision" by the Security Council. 48 Furthermore, Singapore's
proposal became the groundwork for Article 16 of the ICC Statute.

U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3. Accordingly, matters treated by the Security
44.
Council as falling within the category of "other matters" as set out in Article 27(3) have
included, inter alia, those relating to the discharge of its responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, such matters require nine votes
including the "concurring votes of the permanent members." See also EDWARD HiMBRO
ET AL', CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS'215 (3d ed. 1969).
45.
Yee, supra note 34, at 150.
46.
See id. at 151.
Gargiulo, supra note 33, at 88. The Canada proposal stated,
47.
No Investigation or Prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under
this Statute. for a period of twelve months where the Security Council has,
acting under Chapter VII of. the Charter of the United Nations, notified the
Court to that effect. Notification that the Security Council is continuing to act
may be renewed at twelve months intervals.
Id. However, see the Spanish proposal, which limited the extension of the initial
period of suspension requested by the Security Council to a'single further period not
extending twelve months:
1. Where the Security Council is actively dealing with a dispute or a situation
affecting international peace and security and a matter related directly to that
dispute or situation is referred to the Court, the Council, acting under Chapter
VII of the Charter, may call on the Court to desist from commencing or
continuing the corresponding proceedings for a specified period not exceeding
12 months; 2. Upon the expiry of the initial period for which the Security
Council has called for the proceedings before the Court to be suspended, the
Council may similarly call for an extension of the suspension for a further
period not exceeding twelve months, in order to enable it to continue its action
for the maintenance of international peace and security; 3. Both in the case of
the initial request and in that of any subsequent request by the Security
Council, the Court (The Pre-Trial Chamber), having heard the Prosecutor and
any interested State Party, shall decide to suspend the proceedings and
concurrently shall take all necessary measures for the preservation of the
evidence and any other precautionary measures in the interests of justice.
Id. See also U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/C.1/L.20.
Bergsmo et al., supra note 36, at 375-76. Costa Rican text stipulates that
48.
"[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this
statute where the Security Council has, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations, taken a formal and specific decision, and limited for a certain period of
time, to that effect." Id.
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The United Kingdom was the first permanent Security Council
member to advocate changes in the relationship between the ICC and
the Security Council. 49 A British draft for Article 10(2)50 submitted
during the March-April session of PrepCom in 1998 became the basis
for the final draft of Article 16.51
B. Legal Consequences
Under Article 16, the Council may request that the ICC not
investigate or proceed with a prosecution when the requisite majority
of its members conclude that judicial action, or the threat of it, might
harm the Council's efforts to maintain international peace and
security pursuant to the U.N. Charter.5 2 The ICC Statute does not
define what it considers an "investigation and prosecution. '53 The
statute indicates, however, that an "investigation" involves an action
that may be taken with respect to both a situation or an individual,
while a "prosecution" involves actions taken with respect only to a
54
specific person.
The ICC prosecutor may initiate investigations upon receiving a
referral about a particular situation by a State Party to the ICC
Statute or the Security Council.5 5
Upon commencement, an
investigation must comprise the totality of investigative actions
undertaken by the prosecutor under the ICC Statute in order to
confirm the charges against a suspected individual or group. 56 After
evaluating the available information, the ICC prosecutor can initiate
57
an investigation if there is a reasonable basis to proceed.

49.
Id. at 376.
50.
Article 10(2) was formerly Article 23, Paragraph 3 of the 1994 ILC Draft
Statute. See 1994 ILC Statute, supra note 31.
51.
Bergsmo et al., supra note 36, at 376. Pursuant to the U.K. proposal, which
was also included in the Draft ICC Statute which the PrepCom forwarded to the Rome
Conference,
no investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under
this Statute [for a period of 12 months] after the Security Council [, acting
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,] has requested the
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the
same conditions.
Id.
See also Draft Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, U.N. DOC. A/CONF.183/10, art. 10, at 46 [hereinafter Draft Final Act].
52.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, art. 16.
53.
Id.
54.
See, e.g., ICC Statute, supra note 8, arts. 13, 14, 15, 18(1) (2), 19. See also
Bergsmo et al., supra note 36, at 378.
55.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, arts. 13(a), 14. With regard to the S.C. art.
13(b).
56.
Bergsmo et al., supra note 36, at 378.
57.
ICC Statute, supra note 8,arts. 15(2), 53(1).
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Accordingly, one could conclude that still there are steps prior to the
authorization of an investigation that the prosecutor is not precluded
from taking, despite the fact that a Security Council's deferral under
Article 16 took place. The Statute clearly permits the prosecutor to
do the following: (1) conduct a preliminary examination as described
in Article 15; (2) evaluate the information made 'available; 58 (3) seek
"information from States, organs of the United Nations,
intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, or other
reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate;", and (4) receive
"written or oral testimony at the seat of the Court. '59
The language of Article 16 is unclear, which makes interpreting
the law problematic and difficult. Article 16 provides that "[n]o
investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded" after
the Security Council issues a request. 60 Hence, that provision begs
the question: "When does an investigation or prosecution
'commence?'''
The commencement of an investigation may not necessarily
depend on how the ICC's jurisdiction is triggered. The investigation
commences when the ICC prosecutor determines that there is a
"reasonable basis to proceed" and renders a decision to that effect. 61
This is obviously a further or subsequent step to the preliminary
examination and is probably based upon the decision of the Pre-Trial
62
Chamber if the prosecutor is acting proprio motu.
Article 16 suggests that it may not only prevent the start of an
investigation or prosecution, but it also may stop an investigation or a
prosecution that is already underway. 63 Thus, one might wonder how
problems arising from the Council's issuance of a deferral may be
solved, especially once proceedings have begun. The deferral request
raises a number of interesting questions. First, does a person
arrested by a custodial state have to be set free? Second, what
happens to a person who appeared before the ICC pursuant to a
surrender request in accordance with Article 89(1)? Must that person
stay in custody until the 12-month period lapses, or remain in custody
as long as the Council decides? Third, what are the legal
consequences of this decision with regard to that person's human
rights?
Fourth, what are the precautions required for the
preservation of evidence?
Neither the Statute nor the Rules of Procedure and Evidence
appear to have definite answers to the above questions. From an

58.
Id. art. 53(1).
59.
Id. art. 15(2). All of these steps are considered proceedings taken before the
commencement of the investigation. Thus, Article 16 does not cover such steps.
60.
Id. art. 16.
61.
Id. arts. 15(3), 53(1).
62.
Id. art 15(4).
63.
Id. art. 16.
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analytical standpoint, however, one could draw a conclusion to the
first question, beginning with an examination of the deferral decision.
Although all states are bound by the Security Council's decisions,
could the effects of that decision go beyond suspending the
proceedings? In other words, a literal reading of Article 16 suggests
that its power is limited by blocking the commencement of an
64
investigation or prosecution, or stopping an on-going proceeding.
Hence, under a strict interpretation, a deferral decision does not
mean that the defendant is no longer incriminated; rather, because
the decision is procedural and based on political reasons, the
proceedings are merely. suspended for a specified period. A different
interpretation would imply that the Council would be acting as a
judicial body, which is obviously incorrect.
The prosecutor can proceed with the investigation or prosecution
once the deferral period has lapsed and the Council has not renewed
Because releasing the person is not a legal
the deferral. 65
decision, it seems to be discretionary and not
that
from
consequence
66
A person should not be set free,
decision.
dependent on the
with
the most heinous crimes. If a
deals
a
case
when
however,
deferral continues for several years, then a person's right to "be tried
without undue delay" might be violated regardless of whether the
67
person is under custody.
Although the prosecutor may conduct preliminary examinations
after a deferral request is made, the prosecutor's efforts may be
entirely futile or inadequate when destruction of evidence is
imminent. 68 Absent the Security Council's guidance, the prosecutor
may, under Article 54(3)(f, "take necessary measures, or request the
necessary measures be taken [for] .. .the protection of any person or
the preservation of evidence. '6 9 Yet Article 54 might be limited to the
investigative stage, which is supposed to be suspended by the
Security Council's resolution not to commence or proceed with an
investigation. 70 As a result, the prosecutor may be deterred initially

Id.
64.
Id.
65.
There are two observations worth mentioning. First, the Security Council
66.
decision should be treated with great cautious and interpreted narrowly, and thus,
should not amount to any further legal effects other than those mentioned in the text of
Article 16. Thus, the only effects are to block the commencement or stop ongoing
proceedings. Second, from a humanitarian stand point that person may be set free.
However, there is a risk that the person may escape.
Luigi Condorelli et al., Referral and Deferral By the Security Council, in 1
67.
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 652-53

(Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
68.
At the Rome Conference Belgium submitted a proposal pointing to the need
for "further discussion" of preservation of evidence. See Gargiulo, supra note 33, at 90.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, art. 54(3)(). See also Bergsmo et al., supra note
69.
36, at 381.
See generally id. art. 54.
70.

2002
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from pursuing an investigation or taking any further steps related to
the investigation stage.
From an analytical standpoint, measures taken to ensure the
protection of any person or to preserve evidence could be deemed as
protecting what has already been done during the investigation stage
and prior to the deferral decision. Thus, one could argue that those
further measures taken are not contrary to the decision not to
proceed. 71 The latter interpretation serves both the spirit and
purpose of the ICC, absent any clarification regarding the procedures
72
to be taken in a case of sudden deferral of an ongoing investigation.
Article 16 poses another obstacle regarding the number of times
a deferral request may be renewed. A request to defer an ICC
proceeding may be renewed if the renewal is affected by a Security
73
Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.
Article 16 does not limit the number of times a deferral request, may
be renewed, which could be read literally to permit infinite renewals.
Such an interpretation is very dangerous and may ultimately block
the ICC's jurisdiction over many cases.
Interestingly, such an
inconceivable observation has taken place, as seen below.
Notwithstanding the fact that among the leading scholars who
argue that the practical legal effects of Resolution 1422 will not be
severely detrimental, because the Court could still examine the
validity of the aforesaid Resolution, it is unclear, however, how the
Court would address such an examination. 74 Professor William
Schabas stated, "the [ICC] could assess whether or not the Council
was validly acting pursuant to Chapter VII. ' 75 But how could the
Court perform such an examination if required to rule on this issue,

71.

Condorelli shares a similar view:
The administrative duties of the Court linked with the deferred cases
should be completed, [and that some exceptional judicial activities can
still be pursued] after the deferral. That should certainly be the case for
those measures considered appropriate by the Court for the protection
of witnesses and victims, since it would be unacceptable for their safety
and well-being to affected by the deferral of the Security Council.

Condorelli et al., supra note 67, at 654. However, Condorrelli based his argument on a
different premise and different article-namely, Article 68 of the Statute. See id. at
651-52.
72.
See for example the Spanish Proposal to amend Draft Article 10(7),
Gargiulo, supra note 33, at 88-89, which allowed the Court, during the suspension
according to the request of deferral, to take all the necessary measures for the
preservation of evidence and any other precautionary measures in the interest of
justice. See also the Belgium Proposal, which requested adding a sentence at the end
of Article 10(2): "Without prejudice to Art. 86, paragraph' 4, such request shall not
affect the right of the Prosecutor to take the necessary measures to preserve evidence."
Id. at 90.
73.
ICC Statute, supra note 8,art. 16.
74.
SCHABAS, infra note 83, at 66.
75.
Id.
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given the fact that both the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence lack such procedural clarification?
Because the deferral decision hampers the ICC's jurisdiction, the
problem touches the essence of jurisdiction lato sensu. Hence, the
Pre-Trial, Trial, or Appeals Chamber could rule on this question
during the various stages of the proceedings. 76
This Chamber
examines the compatibility of the deferral decision with the
requirements posed by Article 16 of the ICC Statute and Article 39 of
the U.N. Charter.7
In conclusion, Article 16 stands in contrast to Article 13(b).
Security Council action in accordance with Article 13(b) can trigger
the jurisdiction of the ICC by alerting the prosecutor to situations in
which one or more of the crimes listed in Article 5 "appears to have
been committed.17 8 The prosecutor has wide discretion and can
decide not to proceed in accordance with Article 53.79 Thus, the
prosecutor and the ICC can block the Security Council's referral.
Simultaneously, one may analyze the effect of Article 16 on this
scenario differently: the Security Council may be viewed as the ruler
that can block the ICC's jurisdiction over any case simply by
asserting that proceeding with a particular situation or case
threatens international peace and security.
As Morten Bergsmo has observed, Article 16's drafting history
gives rise to some important issues. First, political considerations are
given as much, if not more, weight than legal arguments in
80
determining the Security Council's role during ICC proceedings.
Second, "the Security Council's deferral power confirms its decisive
role in dealing with situations where the requirements of peace and
justice seem to be in conflict. 81 Third, "Article 16 provides the
Council an unprecedented opportunity to influence the work of a

76.
By virtue of Articles 15, 19, 57, 64(2) and 82, the aforementioned Chambers
have the competence to examine this situation through the various stages. For a
thorough discussion regarding the jurisdictional mechanism, see El Zeidy, infra note
128, and also see Condorelli et al., supra note 67, at 649-50, that discusses a similar
view and explains in detail how this scenario could be performed.
77.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, arts. 19, 82.
78.
Id. art. 13(b).
79.
Id. art. 53(1),(2)(c)
The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him
or her, initiate an investigation unless he or she determines that there is no
reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute ... [and] the Prosecutor shall
inform the Pre-Trial Chamber ...or the Security Council in a case under
article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion and the reasons f6r the
conclusion.

Id.
80.
81.

Bergsmo et al., supra note 36, at 377.
Id.
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judicial body."'8 2 This third observation could be interpreted to
impose legal obstacles on the functions of the ICC. The best example
of such an interpretation can be seen through Resolution 1422, which
invoked Article 16 in an abusive manner.

IV.

ARTICLE

16 IN LIGHT

OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

1422

Article 16 proved to have de facto the opposite effect of what its
drafters originally intended-namely, reducing the Security Council's
exclusive power under Article 23 of the ILC Draft. Practically, Article
16 showed that it has a negative effect similar to Article 23(3) of the
ILC Draft. It is not the formulation of Article 16 itself, rather than
its existence, which caused this negative effect. At the opening of the
Rome Conference, states feared that the Security Council's powers
might be bolstered even with the adoption of Singapore's proposals.
Numerous states refused to grant the Security Council any authority
to delay ICC proceedings out of fear that the Council might abuse its
power or obstruct the impartiality of the Court.8 3 Those States
84
Sweden, 85
refusing to grant this authority included Canada,
8
8
87
Poland,8 9
Estonia,
Trinidad and Tobago,8 6 Czech Republic,

82.
Id.
83.
See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 66 (2001).
84.
Gargiulo, supra note 33, at 89. Mr. Lloyd Axworthy (Canada) expressed his
concerns through the following words: "We must not, however, allow the Court to be
paralysed simply because a matter is on the Security Council agenda." See Statement
of Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, June 15, 1998, available at
http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm.
85.
Laila Freivalds (Sweden) said, "We have serious doubts, however, that just
the fact that the Council is Seized with a matter should stop a case, pertaining to that
matter, from being brought before the Court, unless the Council so allows." See
Statement of Laila Freivalds, Minister of Justice of Sweden, June 15, 1998, available at
http://www.un.orglicclindex.htm.
86.
Ramesh Lawrence Maharaj (Trindad & Tobago) said, "[W]e must be
cautious in setting up a Court which would have to await a determination from the
Security Council before it could launch its investigation." Statement of Ramesh
Lawrence Maharaj, Attorney General of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, available
at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm.
87.
Pavel Telicka.(Czech Republic) said, "[W]e cannot support the idea that the
Security Council should have the power to preclude proceedings before the Court."
Statement of Pavel Telicka, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Czech Republic,
available at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm.
88.
Ivan Raig (Estonia) said, "[lIn order to ensure the respect for the basic
principle of law that a Court must be impartial and independent, prosecution should
not be subordinated to a prerogative conferred on the Security Council to prevent or
delay prosecution when it is dealing with a situation under Chapter VII of the
Charter." Statement of Ivan Raig, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Republic of
Estonia, June 17, 1998, available at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm.
89.
Hanna Suchova (Poland) said, "[W]e reject the proposal enabling the
Security Council to obstruct the prosecution for the sole reason that the Council is
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Iran, 90 and India. 91 Regardless of the support provided by prominent
scholars, Singapore's changes to Article 23 (3) of the ILC Draft did
not alleviate the negative effects of current Article 16 as seen below.
Some commentators argue that the Security Council had a
difficult time passing a deferral decision pursuant to Article 16
because a majority vote was needed, consisting of nine affirmative
votes, and including those of the five permanent members. 92 One
may argue, however, that the adoption of Resolution 1422 evinces the
U.S.'s overwhelming political influence upon international law. The
United States showed that it could attain the same or equivalent
demanded powers (single veto) as those formerly included in Article
23(3) of the ILC Draft and absent in the current text of Article 16.
The U.S. threatened to veto the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the International Police Task Force's
(IPTF) renewal if the aformentioned Resolution was not adopted.
With a single vote, the United States succeeded to paralyze the ICC
from exercising future jurisdiction over those particular parties of the
U.S.'s choosing (non-party states). Thus, the United States indirectly
attained the intended goals-namely, the same powers provided in
former Article 23(3) of the ILC Draft, however, it did so through
Article 16.
Despite the adoption of Resolution 1422, statements made by the
majority of the formal 93 and informal 94 delegates demonstrate a

involved in a specific situation." Statement of Hann Suchova, Minister of Justice of
Poland, June 17, 1998, available at http://www.un.org/icc/index.htm.
90.
Javan Zarif (Iran) said, "Initiating the Court's proceedings ...should not
be depended upon the Security Council's permission or approval." Statement of Javan
Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister to the Islamic Republic of Iran, June 17, 1998, available
at http://www.un.orgficc/index.htm. See also Gargiulo, supra note 33, at 89.
91.
India said it was hard to understand or accept any power of the Security
Council to block prosecution,
On the one hand, it is argued that the ICC is being set up to try crimes of the
gravest magnitude. On the other, it is argued that the maintenance of
international peace and security might require that those who have committed
these crimes should be permitted to escape justice, if the Council so decrees.
SCHABAS, supra note 83, at 66.
92.
SCHABAS, supra note 83, at 66. Professor Schabas argues that Article 16 in
its current form makes it difficult for the Council to adopt a resolution regarding its
use. He expressed his idea in the following words: "In practice, this should make it
extremely difficult for the Council to obstruct prosecutions." Id. See also Bergsmo et
al., supra note 36, at 377. Bergsmo argued a similar idea in the following words:
"Because of the public nature of such a resolution and, most likely, the public nature of
the crimes that the Court will be asked to desist from addressing, deferral will be
politically more difficult to justify than approval." Id.
93.
United Kingdom, France, China, Ireland, Mexico, Colombia, Syrian Arab
Republic, Cameroon, Guinea, and Mauritius.
94.
Canada, Samoa, Malaysia, Germany, Argentina, Cuba, New Zealand,
South Africa, Costa Rica, Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Brazil,
Switzerland and Venezuela.
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significant failure and a dramatic step backwards in international
law.
The majority of the participants, including the Council
members, pointed to the dangerous consequences that would likely
They emphasized the
result from adoption of Resolution 1422.
Resolution's potential negative impact on international law, as well
as the impact on credibility of the current and future Council
decisions. Canada's representative, Paul Heinbecker, expressed his
concerns in the following words:
[M]y Government is deeply worried by the discussions that have been
taking place in the Security Council concerning sweeping exemptions
for peace keepers from prosecution from the most serious crimes known
to humanity. . . . First, the issue at stake is larger than the
International Criminal Court; fundamental principles of international
law are in question. Secondly, the Council has not been empowered to
rewrite treaties; the draft resolutions that are circulating contain
elements that exceed the Council's mandate, and passage of them
95
would undermine the credibility of the Council.

Sir Jeremy Greenstock shared similar concerns by accentuating
the U.K.'s opposition toward the U.S. position:
[We understand, but do not share, the concerns of the United States
about the International Criminal Court ... I have listened carefully to
the comments of several representatives about the powers of the
Security Council in this matter. The United Kingdom shares the
concern that actions of the Council should remain within the scope of
its powers. Article 39 of the United Nations Charter is relevant in that
respect. We are equally firm that solutions to this problem should be'
96
consistent with the ICC Statute.

95.
See Statement by the Representative of Canada, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4568th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIPV.4568 (2002), available at http://www.unorg [hereinafter
U.N. Doc S/PV.4568]. See also Letter from the Representative of Canada to the U.N.
President of the Security Council (July 3, 2002), U.N. Doc. S/2002/723. In this letter,
Mr. Heinbecker expressed his concerns to the U.N. Secretary General before the
adoption of Resolution 1422 as follows:
What is at issue in the Council's deliberations of the United Nations Mission
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) item is not just the extension of a
United Nations mission that will end in six months time in any case. Rather,
the issue is a potentially irreversible decision negatively affecting the integrity
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the integrity of treaty
negotiations more generally, the credibility of the Security Council, the
viability of international law with respect to the investigation and prosecution
of grievous crimes, and the established responsibilities of States under
international law to act on such crimes.
Id.
96.
U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4568th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (Resumption 1)
(2002) [hereinafter Resumption 1].
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Moreover, representatives from the following countries raised similar
France, 97 China, 98 Ireland,99 Mexico, 100 Colombia, 10 '
concerns:

97.

U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568, supra note 95. Mr. Levitte (France) said,

France has made a specific proposal regarding article 16 and is ready to discuss
that within the limits of authorized by law-I repeat, within the limits
authorized by law. However, it cannot accept modification, by means of a
Security Council resolution, of a provision of the treaty. Furthermore, even if
the United States manages to persuade a majority of the Council to take that
course of action, one may question the effect of such a resolution on the
decisions to be taken by the Court. It is certainly not in the Council's interest to
see any conflict of norms arise.

Id.
98.

Id. Mr. Wang Yingfan (China) said,

We also believe that the most urgent current task is to find a practical solution.
Such a solution must respect the letter and spirit of the ICC Statute and
accommodate the views and wishes of ICC States Parties. At the same time,
without violating the principles of the ICC, it should fully address the concerns
and requests of countries sending peacekeepers regarding jurisdiction over
crimes committed by such peacekeepers ... [t]he Security Council is not far
from such a solution.
Id. Although China is not yet a State Party to the ICC Statute, and was among those
States that opposed its creation, this statement reflects the importance of respecting
the provisions of such a treaty even by the Security Council when acting as the
executive body of the United Nations.
99.
Id. Mr. Ryan (Ireland) said,
The Development of international law is one of the great achievements of
humankind in recent decades. International Treaties have their own integrity,
which must be protected. This, for Ireland, is a fundamental principle. The
Security Council must respect the spirit and letter of this wider fabric of
international law and international cooperation. In that connection, we are
disturbed by the possibility that, if it is not handled adroitly, the present
exercise could have adverse effects on the credibility and prestige of the
Security Council itself.
Id.
100.

Id. Mr. Aguilar Zinser (Mexico) said,

[M]y Country is concerned about proposals that would grant countries
contributing troops and other personnel to missions established or authorized
by the Security Council any sort of immunity vis-a'-vis the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court. My delegation has serious difficulties in
subscribing to proposals that would establish such exemption regimes, because
of their implications both for the functioning of peacekeeping operations and for
the integrity of the system of international jurisdiction ... [m]y delegation
believes that the credibility of the Council's work may be adversely affected
with the approval of decisions counter to the integrity of the international legal
system.... The Security Council is without question the proper body in which
to deal with matters relating to peacekeeping operations. But we doubt
whether it is the proper forum in which to deal with matters relating to the
International Criminal Court, particularly if what is at issue would undermine
one of the essential features of any judicial body: the independent exercise of its
jurisdiction ... [w]e-the States parties to the Rome Statute and all States
signatories that have committed ourselves to not taking any action, in any
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Mauritius, 10 5
Syrian Arab Republic, 0 2 Cameroon, 10 3 Guinea, 10 4
0 9
08
10 7
10 6
Cuba, 110 New
Argentina,
Germany,
Malaysia,
Samoa,

circumstances, that would undermine the Courts' objective and purpose-are
faced with a dangerous precedent, which, if accepted, would represent a de
facto amendment to the Rome Statute.
Id.
Mr. Valdivieso (Colombia) said., "[A]
101.
Resumption 1, supra note 96.
resolution of this kind ... would lead us to absurd conclusions ... from the legal
standpoint, one would be expecting the Court to act on the basis of the Council's
resolution and not in accordance with the Statute that brought it into being." Id.
Id. Mr. Wehbe (Syrian Arab Republic) said,
102.
In conclusion, we would stress once again that the Security Council does not
have the right to take decisions under Chapter VII to amend an intenational
treaty that has entered into force, because this would constitute a precedent
that would destabilize and undermine the international legal regime. Such an
action is also outside the purview of the Security Council, whose principle task,
as set out in the Charter, is the maintenance of international peace and
security.
Id.
Id. Mr. Tidjani (Cameroon) said, "We must make every effort to prevent
103.
the Court from being weakened and to make it effective and efficient.... There must
be no clash between the International Criminal Court and the Security Council: both
are working for peace." Id.
Mr. Diallo (Guinea) said, "In conformity with the principles of
104.
Id.
international law and bearing in mind the hierarchy of legal norms, no Security
Council resolution could therefore modify a provision of an international treaty." Id.
U.N. Doc S/PV.4568, supra note 95. Mr. Koonjul (Mauritius) said, "As a
105.
party to the Rome Statue, Mauritius firmly believes that any provision undermining
the jurisdiction of the ICC as provided in the Statute would be inconsistent, and
incompatible with the precepts of international law based on the will of the comity of
nations." Id.
Resumption 1, supra note 96. Mr. Slade (Samoa) said, "We do recognize
106.
and we do respect the concerns of the United States .... Putting the Rome Statute at
risk in the process cannot be an option." Id.
Id. Mr. Hasmy (Malaysia) said,
107.
What is at stake is a fundamental principle of international law. It is vitally
important for the Council not to take a decision that would have the effect of
changing or amending the terms of an international treaty, which the United
States draft resolution sets out to do in respect of the Rome Statute .... We
fear that adoption of the United States proposal would place the Security
Council in a difficult position. Its credibility would be questioned.
Id.
Id. Mr. Schumacher (Germany) said, "[T]he Security Council would do
108.
in effect,
itself and the world community a disservice if it adopted a resolution, ...
amend an important treaty ratified by 76 States." Id.
Id. Mr. Listre (Argentina) said, "The proposals that are being considered in
109.
the Security Council might be detrimental to the ICC and to the Security Council itself.
More generally, they might be injurious to the United Nations and to the rule of law."
Id.
Id. Mr. Rodriguez Parrilla (Cuba) said,
110.
The Security Council is not the appropriate organ . . . to discuss the
International Criminal Court (ICC) simply because the Charter of the United
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Zealand,"' South Africa, 112 Costa Rica, 113 Islamic Republic of Iran, 114
and
Switzerland, 118
Brazil, 117
Liechtenstein," 6
Jordan, 115

Nations does not confer on it powers to do so. However, the issue being
discussed today has implications for the very essence of the United Nations
system and itscapacity for maintenance of international peace and security. It
has to do with the principles of international law .... In essence, what we are
debating today is the validity of the Charter of the United Nations and the
mandate it has conferred on the Security Council.
Id.
U.N. Doc S/PV.4568, supra note 95. Mr. MacKay (New Zealand) said,
111.
"Member States would have to question the legitimacy and legality of this exercise of
the role and responsibility entrusted to the Council were that [resolution] to occur." Id.
112.
Id. Mr. Kumalo (South Africa) said, "We urge the Security Council to
stand firm and protect the peace mission in the Balkans, while reinforcing-certainly
not jeopardizing-the International Criminal Court and the norms of international law
it has established." Id.
113.
Mrs. Chassoul (Costa Rica) said,
The States Members of the Rio Group cannot accept any erosion of the Rome
Statute. . . . We are therefore concerned at any initiative attempting to
substantially modify the provisions of the Statute by means of a Council
resolution. To adopt this kind of proposal would exceed the competence of the
Security Council and would have a serious impact on the Council's credibility
and legitimacy.
Id.
114. Id. Mr. Fadaifard (Islamic Republic of Iran) said, "[W]e expect that all
members of the Security Council take note of and accept the fact that the Council is not
authorized to interpret or amend treaties." Id.
115. Id. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein (Jordan) said,
And should the Council consider again the adoption of a draft resolution on the
ICC falling under chapter VII, it will edge itself toward acting ultra vires-that
is, beyond its authority under the Charter .... We are opposed, however, to
any course of action by the Security Council the effect of which would be not
only to undermine the Court, but to also deliver a crippling blow to the manner
by which the international community negotiates multilateral treaties in the
future.
Id.
116.

Id. Mrs. Fritsche (Liechtenstein) said,

We do not want to see the Council put itself in a position in which the United
Nations membership at large is forced to question the legality of one of its
decisions. Such a situation would have a devastating impact on the credibility
of the Council and thus of the Organization as a whole.
Id.
117.

Id. Mr. Fonseca (Brazil) said,

We came here to make a strong appeal to all members of the Council not to
take hasty decisions that might cause irreparable damage to peacekeeping, to
the rule of international law and the very credibility of the Council. We
strongly discourage proposals or initiatives that ultimately seek to reinterpret
or review the Rome Statute.
118.

Id. Mr. Staehelin (Switzerland) said,
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Venezuela. 1 9 The views expressed by all of these countries, although
not identical, intersect at a point that reflects and touches the heart
of the main dilemma-namely, the potential dangers of adopting the
Resolution.
Resolution 1422 was adopted despite the reservations held by
the international community. How and why the Council reached the
majority of nine affirmative votes, despite the obvious opposition
toward the Resolution by many Member States, remains a mystery.
The votes contradicted the Council members' early statetments and
attitudes de facto.
From an analytical standpoint, one may draw two distinct
First, the members could have re-examined the
conclusions.
Resolution and discovered that it conformed to Article 16 of the ICC
Statute. This is questionable, however, because the main dilemma is
not limited to interpretation of Article 16. The Resolution raises
some doubts about its conformity with the fundamental norms of
international law as embedded, for example, in the U.N. Charter and
the Law of Treaties. The competence of the Council to amend treaties
without states' consent and to act as a judicial body in order to
interpret a provision set out in a treaty is uncertain. On the other
hand, it would be unreasonable to argue that the ten members of the
Council who positively commented on the Resolution suddenly and
12 0
unanimously changed their views.
Second, the final outcome suggests that political pressure
prevailed and paved the way toward the adoption of the

The Security Council's adoption of a resolution modifying a treaty that is in
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations is inconceivable as a
solution. That would be a serious development for the future of international
law and of the United Nations, and it would directly affect the authority of the
Council itself.

Id.
119.

Id. Ms. Pulido Santana (Venezuela) said,

[W]e view with great concern the situation that has arisen within the Council
concerning the possibility through a decision, this principal organ might
A decision by the
weaken the Statute of the International Criminal Court ....
Council to [amend the Statute] that effect . . .' would be questionable both
politically and legally. Such a decision would exceed the Council's competence
and would disrupt the international legal order.

Id.
It is interesting to note that, despite the statement made by the U.K.
120.
Representative, President of the Council, opposing the Resolution, it has been reported
that the U.S. and U.K. alliance led to adoption of the Resolution. In this respect, see
CICC, UN Security Council PassesICC Resolution in Contravention of UN Charter, at
(last visited Oct. 1,
http:I/www.iccnow.orghtml/PressAntilCCProposalPasseSC.doc
2002).
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Resolution. 12 1 The possibility that the United States might exercise
its veto power to deter the UNMIBH's renewal and keep the latter as
a hostage for the adoption of Resolution 1422 was probably the
controlling factor in the Council's decision. 122 Though the United
States politically achieved its inherent goals, it failed, together with
the members of the Council, to adopt a proper legal resolution that
was consistent with the essence of the Statue, and that conformed to
international law principles.

V.

RESOLUTION

1422

IN LIGHT OF THE
TREATIES

U.N.

CHARTER AND LAW OF

Despite opposition by many states, it is possible to justify the
fact that Resolution 1422 invokes Article 16 of the ICC Statute.
Those states consider that the Resolution lacks an essential element
that would have prevented its adoption: the existence of a threat to
world peace or an act of aggression. 123 Though among those states
who believed that the Resolution was contrary to Article 39 of the
U.N. Charter, 1 24 they could not possibly deny that Bosnia and
through
supervision
international
required
Herzegovina
to
a
threat
peacekeeping operations. Thus, determining whether
peace existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a matter for the
Security Council. The Council could probably witness that impeding

121.
Professor Bassiouni expected such pressure and expressed his fears in the
following words: "Real politicians will surely try to manipulate the ICC, as they do
other international institutions, by limiting its effective administration, imposing
financial controls, or frustrating the enforcement of its decisions. They will also try to
bypass the ICC by the devise of amnesties." M. Cherif Bassiouni, Combating Impunity
For International Crimes, 71 COLO. L. REV. 409, 421 (2000). Accordingly, it could be
argued that the adoption of Resolution 1422 frames and mirrors the aforementioned
wording.
See S.C. Res. 1423, supra note 4. This Resolution extends the mandate of
122.
UNMIBH, which includes the IPTF, for an additional period terminating on December
31, 2002. Adopting Resolution 1423 immediately after adopting Resolution 1422
demonstrates the aforementioned view-political pressure played a major role, and
without the adoption of Resolution 1422, Resolution 1423 would have never come into
being.
For example, see statements made by the representatives of Canada,
123.
Jordan, Samoa, and Germany. See U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568, supra note 95; Resumption 1,
supra note 96, at 1.
124.
For example, see statement made by the Representative of United Kingdom
(President of the Council):
Finally, I have listened carefully to the comments of several representatives
about the powers of the Security Council in this matter. The United Kingdom
shares the concern that actions of the Council should remain within the scope
of its powers. Article 39 of the United Nations Charter is relevant in that
respect.
Resumption 1, supranote 96.
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the contribution of peacekeepers by any means, including judicial
interference, might harm the Council's efforts to maintain
international peace and security. 125
This conclusion might be
acceptable, particularly in light of the overwhelming international
support to assist Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, Resolution
1423 delineates the international community's desire to continue
peacekeeping operations by extending the UNMIBH's mandate. A
threat to international peace and security might still exist that
induced the Security Council to act under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. 26 Nonetheless, if these findings justify the Council's action
to invoke Article 16, they cannot justify its abusive application.
The main dilemma lies in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Resolution
1422. Paragraph 1 states the following:
[The Security Council requests], consistent with the provisions of
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving
current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a
Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a United
Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelve.month
period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation
or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides
otherwise.

Paragraph 2 states: "[The Security Councilexpresses] the intention to
renew the request in paragraph 1 under the same conditions each 1
12 7
July for further 12-month periods for as long as may be necessary."'
Paragraph 2's reference to an automatic renewal procedure is
problematic. In particular, the wording of the Resolution expressly
suggests that the Council intended to block the ICC's jurisdiction not
only for 12 months, but for an indefinite duration.

125.
However, it might be argued that, it is hardly imaginable that judicial
interference could be treated as threat to the peace. Moreover, preambular Paragraph
7 of Resolution 1422, S.C. Res. 1422, supra note 1, stipulates, "[I]t is in the interests of
international peace and security to facilitate Member States' ability to contribute to
operations established or authorized by the United Nations Security Council," and
accentuates that the Council determination for the existence of threat to the peace is
based on this paragraph and not that there exist a mere fact that the situation in
Bosnia constitutes a threat to the peace. Id. Accordingly, it could be further argued
that whereas peace keepers are not legally ceased from taking their missions; whereas
the ICC cannot assert jurisdiction unless those soldiers commit the acts enumerated in
Articles 6,7, and 8 of the ICC Statute in a massive manner; whereas, by virtue of the
principle of complementarity, the ICC would not be able to act as the Court of first
instance; therefore, the situation of existence of threat to the peace and security that
triggers Article 16 does not exist. Thus, any claim that invoking Article 16 would
maintain peace and security should be disregarded. The ICC's main target is to work to
maintain peace through putting an end to impunity. Thus, acting as a deterrent.
However, the final outcome of Article 16 placed the ICC into this inconceivable
position. Professor William Schabas, during one of his representations, said that
Article 16 is a small price to be paid in order to keep the Council happy.
126.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
127.
S.C. Res. 1422, supra note 1.
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Although the language of Article 16 appears to permit a deferral
for an infinite period, 128 specific conditions must be met to renew
deferrals. The Security Council has ignored those conditions. Article
16 stipulates that "[n]o Investigation or prosecution may be
commenced ... for a period of 12 months after the Security Council,
in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nation ...,,129 "that request may be renewed by,the Council
'130
under the same conditions.
From an analytical view, one might construe that the final
clause-"request may be renewed by the Council under the same
conditions"131-as requiring the Council to follow all the necessary
steps for initiating a deferral request. These steps necessitate that a
resolution be adopted by virtue of Chapter VII, 1 32 requesting that the
ICC defer the commencement or continuation of an investigation or
prosecution for up to 12 months. 133 Moreover, any renewal request
should be followed by a new resolution pursuant to Chapter VII soon
after the initial deferral period's expiration date and not exceeding
the 12-month period. 134 Alternative methods of interpretation would
lead to very dangerous consequences that would hamper the ICC's
operations and run counter to the main object and purpose of the
Rome Treaty. This interpretation is consistent with Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which requires "Good
Faith," "Ordinary Meaning," and "Context" when interpreting
135
international treaties.
Article 31 combines all the schools of treaty interpretation into
one rule to be used in a "single combined operation."'136 Thus,

128.
Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principleof Complementarity:A New Machinery To
Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming November
2002). See also Bergsmo et al., supra note 36, at 382; Yee, supra note 34, at 151-52.
129.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, art. 16.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Explanatory Note on the ICC Statute, 71 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL 1, 17 (2000).

133.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, art. 16.
134.
Id.
135.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 39/26, reprinted in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1459-60 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
136.
Golder v. United Kingdom, 14 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 9 (1975). See also
MARTIN DIXON ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 86-89 (3d ed. 2000).

These schools are "intentions of the parties" or "founding fathers" school, the "textual"
or "ordinary meaning of the words" school, 'and the "teleological" or "aims and objects"
school.
[T]he ideas of these three schools are not necessarily exclusive of one another,
and theories of treaty interpretation can be constructed (and are indeed
normally held) compounded of all three .... For the "intentions" school, the

prime, indeed the only legitimate, object is to ascertain and give effect to the
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according to P.K. Menon, the principle of interpretation in good faith
"flows directly from the rule pacta sunt servanda,"'13 7 which requires
that the treaty is to be "read in some sense as a whole so that one
'138
clause may be called in aid to explain an ambiguity in another.
Similarly, A.D. McNair stated:
[T]he performance of treaties is subject to an over-riding obligation of
mutual good faith. This obligation is also operative in the sphere of the
interpretation of treaties, and it would be a breach of this obligation for
a party to make use of an ambiguity in order to put forward an
interpretation, which it was known to the negotiators of the treaty not
139
to be the intention of the parties.

In addition, L. Oppenheim,1 40 Anthony Aust, 14 1 and P.K.
Menon 142 share the view that the ordinary meaning is not to be,
"determined in the abstract [but] in the context of the treaty and in
light of its object and purpose. '143 In its Advisory Opinion on the
Competence of the ILO to Regulate Agricultural Labour, the
Permanent Court of International 'Justice
accentuated the
144
significance of examining the entire treaty as a whole:
[In considering the question before the Court upon the language of the
Treaty, it is obvious that the Treaty must be read as a whole, and that
its meaning is not to be determined merely upon particular phrases

intentions, or presumed intentions, of the parties: the approach is therefore to
discover what these were, or must be taken to have beeh. For the "meaning of
the text" school, the prime object is to establish what the text means according
to the ordinary meaning or apparent signification of its terms: the approach is
therefore through the study and analysis of the text. For the "aims and objects"
schoot it is the general purpose of the treaty itself that counts, considered to
some extent as having, or as having come to have, an existence of its own,
independent of the original intentions of the framers. The main object is to
establish this general purpose, and construe the particular clauses in the light
of it: hence it is such matters as the general tenor and atmosphere of the
treaty, the circumstances in which it was made, the place it has come to have in
international life, which for this school indicate the approach to interpretation.
Id. See also Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedureof the InternationalCourt of
Justice: Treaty Interpretationand Certain other Treaty Points, 1951 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
1, 1 (1951).

137.
Vienna Convention, supra note 135, art. 26. For a thorough discussion on
the principle of good faith, see Anthony D'Amato, Good Faith, in II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 599-601 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995).
138.
P.K. MENON, THE LAW OF TREATIES BETWEEN STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 78 (1992).
139.
A.D. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 465 (1961).
140.
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1273 (Robert Jennings et al. eds., 9th

ed. Longman 1992).
141.

ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 188 (2000).

142.
MENON, supra note 138, at 78.
143.
AUST, supra note 141, at 188.
144.
Advisory Opinion, International Labor Organization-Competence to
Regulate Conditions of Agricultural Labor, Etc., 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) nos. 2 & 3, at 23.
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which, if detached from the Context, may be interpreted in more than
14 5
one sense.

The context of the treaty shall be also comprised of its preamble in
addition to its text. 146 Therefore, the ordinary meaning of Article 16
must be determined considering the totality of the previously
mentioned elements. By applying these elements to the text of
Article 16, one could deduce that the foregoing construction is
grounded both in fact and in law.
Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1422 expressed an intention for
renewing such deferrals in advance. Consequently, the mechanism
for renewals affects an essential element required by Article 16: the
determination of a threat to peace. 147 Acting under Chapter VII
requires the existence of a threat to peace, which undoubtedly cannot
be precisely determined in advance. 148
As a requirement, the
Security Council obtains "particular information" by conducting an
investigation pursuant to Article 34 of the Charter 149 on the basis of
Chapter VI, 150 in order to determine whether a situation constitutes a
threat to international peace. Thus, it is questionable whether the
Council is capable of seeking unpredicted information one year in

145.
Id. See also H. Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretationand the Principle of
Effectivness in the Interpretationof Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 73, 79-80 (1949).
Professor Lauterphact observed the idea of interpretation in light of the totality even
before the adoption of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. He expressed himself
in the following words: "In these and similar cases the common intention in relation to
the particular case must be derived from the common intention of the treaty as a
whole-from its policy, its object, and its spirit." Id. Furthermore, in the early case of
The Ionian Ships, Dr. Lushington insisted on the significance of looking "to the whole
of the instrument and not to a part, [because] terms, however, strong and clear in
themselves, whatever meaning may be attributed-necessarily attributed-to them
standing alone, may be modified by other parts of the same instrument....
[T]he
whole treaty creates one obligation." A.D. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES: BRITISH
PRACTICE AND OPINIONS 198 (1938).
146.
Vienna Convention, supra note 135, art. 31(2). The preamble to the ICC
Statute, supra note 8, para. 5, reads: "Determined to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes."
147.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, art. 16.
148.
New Zealand for example held a similar view during the meetings:
"Attempts to invoke the procedure laid down in article 16 of the Rome Statute in
generic resolution, not in response to a particular fact situation, and on an ongoing
basis, are inconsistent with both the terms and purpose of that article." U.N. Doc.
S/PV.4568, supra note 95. Parliamentarians for Global Action, ParliamentariansTake
Action on Security Council Resolution 1422 To Prevent Its Renewal, at
http://www.iccnow.org.
149.
U.N. CHARTER art. 34 ("The Security Council may investigate any dispute,
or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in
order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.").
150.
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 613 (Bruno Simma
ed., 1994).
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advance, given the fact that Paragraph 19 of Resolution 1423 declares
that the mandate of UNMIBH terminates on December 31, 2002.151
The essence of Article 16 requires that situations involving a
threat to peace be examined on a case-by-case basis. Any different
construction would suggest that the Council is blocking the ICC's
jurisdiction by virtue of a fictional future existence of threat to the
peace, and not a factual existing or imminent situation of threat to
the peace, a practice that is contrary to the letter of both Article 16 of
the ICC Statute and Article 39 of the U.N. Charter. 152 Consequently,
the current language of Paragraph 2 of Resolution 1422 is an
amendment to the text of Article 16, and thus, it is questionable
whether the Council has authority to amend a provision in a treaty
under Chapter VII.
Indeed, the Security Council has the power to create
international judicial bodies in response to situations where
international peace and security are compromised. Yet that does not
mean that the Council has the competence to intervene in the
technical and legal functions of those judicial bodies. The famous
case arising in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), Prosecutorv. Tadic, supports that argument:
[T]he establishment of the International Tribunal by the Security
Council does not signify, however ....
that the Security Council was
usurping for itself part of a judicial function which does not belong to it
but to other organs of the United Nations according to the Charter.
The Security Council has resorted to the establishment of a judicial
organ in the form of an international criminal tribunal as an

151.
S.C. Res. 1423, supra note 4, para. 19. Accordingly, there is no need to block
the Court's jurisdiction indefinitely because that threat would not exist after the expiry
date of UNMIBH. However, paragraph 10 of the same Resolution authorizes Member
States "to continue for a further planned period of 12 months the multinational
stabilization force (SFOR) as established in accordance with its resolution 1088 (1996)."
Id. para. 10. Although the latter paragraph might support the Council in its decision
regarding the determination of a current factual existence of a threat to the peace, it
does not authorize the Council to determine an existence of threat to the international
peace one year in advance.
152.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, art. 16; U.N. CHARTER art. 39; LELAND
GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS
266 (2d ed., rev. 1949). "In the course of discussions in the Security Council, it was
made clear that this did not mean that Article 39 was only applicable when 'the
menace to peace' was 'on the point of being realized."' GOODRICH ET AL., supra, at 266.
Accordingly, it could be argued that this wording paves the way for accepting an
interpretation that Security Council's action where a situation is imminent and did not
actually exist could be valid. For clarity regarding the term "imminent," see Mohamed
El Zeidy, The ECHR and States of Emergency: Article 15-A Domestic Power of
Derogation from Human Rights Obligations, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. (forthcoming
2003).

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRAN5NATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 35'1503

instrument for the exercise of its own principal function of maintenance
153
of peace and security ....

Hence, the Security Council's powers cannot extend to cover
issues beyond its original mandate. 154 Therefore, Paragraph 2 of
Resolution 1422 is contrary to Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, which limits amendments of multilateral treaties
to its parties, "unless the treaty otherwise provides." 155 In a letter to
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on July 3, 2002, U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Anan expressed his concerns regarding Resolution 1422.
The U.N. Secretary General's famous words were that the Security
Council must not take action that might "[fly] in the face of treaty
law."'5 6
Despite the inconsistency between Resolution 1422 on one hand,
and Article 16 and the Law of Treaties on the other, the Security
Council's decision can be binding and can override any other treaty
obligation. 157 By virtue of Articles 24, 25, and 103 of the U.N.
Charter, the obligations arising from such a resolution have
supremacy and prevail.
This holds true, however, only if the
requirements of these Articles have been legally satisfied.
Obtaining the force of law requires that the terms in Articles 24,
25, and 103 of the U.N. Charter be legally fulfiled. According to
Article 24(1), the Security Council has the primary responsibility of
maintaining international peace and security. 158 "In discharging [its]
duties [to maintain international peace and security], the [Security
Council] 'shall act in accordance with the purposes and Principles of
the United Nations."1 59 The language of the this sentence indicates
that, while the political approach is intended in the actions of the

153.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72,
36 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 2, 1995),
reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty.
154.
This does not mean that the Council is not authorized to rule on lkgal
issues because in various occasions the Council had to face both situations in its
determination of existence of threat to the peace under Chapter VII. However, what is
meant here is that the Council's legal powers should be limited within the framework
of its mandate, thus preventing any political abuse of this power. Thus, Resolution
1422 reflects the latter inconceivable consequence.
155.
Vienna Convention, supra note 135, art. 40.
156.
Letter from Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen., to Colin Powell, U.S. Sec'y of
State (July 3, 2002), available at http://www.iccnow.org/htmlISGlettertoSC3July2002.
pdf.
157.
U.N. CHARTER art. 103; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 140,
at 1215-16. See also Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of
the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v.
U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 89,
42 (Apr. 14); (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 88,
37 (Apr. 14). In
the separate opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen stated that, "By virtue of Article 103 of the
Charter, that obligation prevails over any conflicting treaty obligation which Libya
may have." Id. (separate opinion of J. Shahabuddenn).
158.
U.N. CHARTER art. 24(1).
159. Id. para. 2.
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United Nations, the limits of the law of the Charter have to be
161
observed. 160 Therefore, the Council cannot act arbitrarily.
Meanwhile, Article 25 mandates that Member States accept and
carry out the Security Council's decisions that arise under Articles
24(2) and 39 of the U.N. Charter. 162 Nonetheless, accepting or
carrying out the decisions of the Security Council has to be "in
accordance with the [U.N. Charter].' 1 63 This construction has been
164
affirmed by the "founding fathers" of the Charter.
One may reasonably deduce that the Security Council's decisions
must be consistent with the entire Charter, including its principles
and purposes. Additionally, one may argue that the goals intended
and reflected in the Charter's Preamble and other provisions should
not be interpreted in light of the circumstances in which the United

160.

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 150, at

401.
161.
Id. at 404.
162.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 24(2), 25, 39. Article 39 stipulates, "The Security
Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be.
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace
and security." Id. art. 39.
163.
Id. art. 25.
164.
THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 150, at
410. However, the founding fathers of the Charter held another interpretation to the
phrase "in accordance with the present Charter,"-namely, Article 25 might be read in
such a way that the quoted phrase is related to the Charter obligation of the members
to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council on the basis of the.mere
wording of Article 25. Id. Nonetheless, they argued that both interpretations are
"quite acceptable." Id. Although it has been emphasized that the interpretation
mentioned above in the text is acceptable, still, it has been countered that adopting
such an interpretation that grants "such an extensive right to examine the decisions of
the [Security Council], would, indeed, weaken the peace-keeping system of the UN and
the proper functioning of the [Security Council], or would even destroy it altogether."
See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 459-60 (2d ed., Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 2002). Despite the fact that this is a well constructed argument, it
can still be contested. One cannot imagine that the Security Council would be granted
unlimited powers that might even rise to contradict peremptory norms jus cogens
without being challenged as seen in the next section of this Article. Moreover, to accept
this argument means that states are asked to disregard the other purposes and
principles of the Charter that are set out, for example, in its Preamble and Article 1 as
mentioned in the above text. Thus, it is hardly imaginable that the phrase in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law is superfluous and was
inserted into the text for no need. Good faith and ordinary meanings are main
components in treaty interpretations. However, one might wonder whether it is
possible to counter that even the rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties could be overridden by virtue of Article 103 of the
Charter, and thus, regular and appropriate rules of interpretation could be
disregarded. Accordingly, the aforementioned phrase could be disregarded when
reading Article 1(1). On the other hand, even if one presumes that the application of
the phrase might be restricted to special situations for the sake of respecting the
effectiveness of the Security Council's actions, one cannot accept the view that it could
be derogated from even when conflicting with peremptory norms as seen below.
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Nations was created, therefore giving priority to maintaining peace
and security. While the goal or purpose of maintaining peace and
security must be of great significance, it should not be achieved at the
expense of compromising the United Nation's other objectives. After
the development of the International Human Rights Law, all U.N.
goals or objectives, including maintenance of peace and security,
should be regarded as indivisible and equally important. Thus, the
maintenance of peace should not be achieved solely, but within the
framework of the other U.N. goals or objectives. This trend of
"evolutionary interpretation" has been also followed by the ICJ on
several occasions. In its advisory opinion on Namibia, the Court
stated that "[i]nterpretation cannot remain unaffected by the
subsequent development of law, . . . Moreover, an international
instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of
the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the
165
interpretation."
In addition, in an early concurring opinion, Judge Alvarez
expressed an opinion that is relevant for the interpretation of the
Charter:
[W]ith regard to the interpretation of legal texts [U.N. Charter], it is
to be observed that ... an institution, once established, acquires a life
of its own, independent of the elements which have given birth to it,
and it must develop, not in accordance with the views of those who
created it, but in accordance with the requirements of international
life. 1 6 6
...

Among the other goals or purposes of the Charter is "to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained.' 1 67
In addition, the Charter has two other main
purposes:
[To] bring about . . . in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
16 8
[and to promote
situations which might lead to breach of the peace,
and encourage] respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
169
for all without distinction.

The Charter's most important criterion in the context of Resolution
1422, however, is that a situation demonstrating a factual or an

165.
I.C.J. Reports 1971, at 31.
166.
I.C.J. Reports 1947-8, at 67-68.
U.N. Charter pmbl. para. 3
167.
For a thorough discussion regarding the travaux
168.
Id. art. 1(1).
preparatories of Article 1 and its different interpretations, see Craig Scott et al., A
Memorial for Bosnia: Framework of Legal Arguments Concerning the Lawfullness of the
Maintenance of the United Nations Security Council's Arms Embargo on Bosnia and
Herzegovina, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 113-20 (1994).
169.
Id. para. 3. See also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 277-78 (2001).
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imminent threat to peace should exist within the meaning of Articles
24(2) and 39.
Because the Security Council did not comply with the above
prerequisites when adopting Resolution 1422, it is possible to argue
that Articles 24 and 25 of the Charter have not been satisfied in order
to invoke Article 103. It also follows that, Resolution 1422 may not be
valid and imposes positive obligations because the Council, in
discharging its duties pursuant to Chapter VII, did not comply with
all of the requirements set out in Articles 24(2) and 25, the Preamble,
and Article 1(1)(3) of the U.N. Charter. Moreover, initially the
Council should not invoke Chapter VII where a threat to peace does
not imminently or factually exist.170

Consequently, Article 103

should not be invoked because conditions precedent or the obligations
which were supposed to arise from the Resolution and required to
171
activate the Article do not exist.

VI.

RESOLUTION

1422

AND JUS COGENS

The ICC's jurisdiction is limited to the most heinous crimes that
affect the international community as a whole. They are known as
offenses against the law of nations, deliciti jus gentium.172 The ICC
Statute considers "heinous" such crimes as genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and aggression.' 7 3 These heinous crimes
require a high degree of human repression, and therefore, they lie
174
under the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC.

Heinous crimes-those most grave and extraordinary-are also
categorized as jus cogens norms, which hold the highest hierarchical
position among all other norms and principles. 175 According to Judge
170.
It is interesting to note that paragraph (1) of Resolution 1422 "requests,
[deferral to be] consistent with the provisions of Article 16." S.C. Res. 1422, supra,note
1. Thus, the Resolution is contradictory because Article 16 itself requires the existence
of a Chapter VII situation to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Hence, absent a
factual situation of threat to the peace, the decision regarding renewal in advance is a
clear demonstration of the inconsistency.
171.
In such a case Article 103 cannot be triggered because there are no
conflicting obligations arising from the Rome Statute and that Resolution, and because,
arguably, the Security Council decision is not valid to render any obligations.
172.

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW

AND PRACTICE 566 (3d ed. 1996).
173.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, arts. 5-8.
174.
Id. pmbl. paras. 4, 5.
175.

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 40, 41 (2d

ed. 1999). See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (4th
ed. 1996); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 96 (4th ed. 2001); Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1, § VI, 153 (Dec. 10, 1998) ("[J]us cogens ... is a norm that
enjoys a higher rank in the international hierarchy than treaty law and even 'ordinary'
customary rules."); Prosecutor v. Delacic., No. IT-96-21-T, 454 (November 16, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23/1, 466 (Feb. 22, 2001).
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Hersch Lauterpacht, "[the Concept of jus cogens operates as a
176
concept superior to both customary international law and treaty.
Recognizing those international crimes as being part of jus cogens
results in a duty to extradite or prosecute, the non-applicability of
statute of limitations, and the exercise of the universality of
177
jurisdiction over offenders.
Categorizing certain crimes as jus cogens places upon the States
the obligatio erga omnes not to grant impunity to the violators of such
crimes.17 8 The existing genesis of the obligatio erga omnes concept
for jus cogens crimes is found in the ICJ's advisory opinion on
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide.179 The erga omnes and jus cogens concepts "[a]re often
presented as two sides of the same coin: Erga omnes means flowing to
all; [therefore], obligations deriving from jus cogens are presumably
erga omnes. Legal logic supports the proposition that what is
compelling law must necessarily engender an obligation that is

176.
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia (Serb. & Mont.))
100 (Sept. 13) (separate
(Indication of Provisional Measures), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 440
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
177.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 175, at 39, 41. -See also A1-Adsani v. United
Kingdom, 34 E.H.R.R. 11, *283, *285 (2002).
Bassiouni, supra note 175, at 39. See also Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving
178.
Concept of Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383, 393 (2001); M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Accountability for International Crime and Serious Violations of
Fundamental Human Rigths." International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligation Erga
Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 66 (1996); Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (February 5). The ICJ defined the
concept of erga omnes and its legal effect towards the entire community in the following
terms:
[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State
towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-A-vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the
former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights
involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they
are obligations erga omnes.
Id.
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
179.
Punishment of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J Rep. 15 (May 28). See also Case Concerning the
Application of the Convention- on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bos. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 4,! 27-33 33 (July 11). The I.C.J.
expressed itself regarding obligations erga omnes in the following words: "The Court is
of the view that it follows from the object and purpose of the Convention that the rights
and obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights and obligations erga omnes."
Id. This wording emphasize that the Convention imposes an obligation erga omnes to
punish and prevent the crime of Genocide. Id. at 25.
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'flowing to all.' 180 Consequently, obligations erga omnes to prosecute
1 81
or extradite criminals will naturally flow from jus cogens crimes.
Interestingly, Resolution 1422 in its current form seems to
override the jus cogens and erga omnes concepts. Although the
Resolution's purpose is to shield the peacekeeping forces of non-state
members of the Rome Treaty from ICC jurisdiction, the fact that
heinous crimes enjoy a jus cogens status, however, should make it
legally impossible to grant their perpetrators safe haven. 18 2 Even
though Resolution 1422 does not prevent other alternatives to
prosecution, ironically, its adoption and the intention to permanently
block the ICC's jurisdiction, which might actually permit perpetrators
83
to escape justice, is a de facto legitimization of impunity.'
On the other hand, it could be argued that because treaties may
not create obligations or rights for a third-party state without its
consent, it is legally permissible for those offenders not to stand trial
before the ICC.'8 4 Thus, Resolution 1422 is restricted to the
preservation of the rights of third-party states. Nonetheless, that
limit on jurisdiction is irrelevant when the most odious crimes are
involved. In Furundzija, the ICTY emphasized that peremptory
norms create a deterrent effect because "[they] signal to all States
and individuals that the prohibitions they envisage are absolute
18 5
values from which nobody must deviate."'
Some of the crimes listed under the ICC Statute have also been
86
listed in other treaties as crimes deserving mandatory prosecution.'
All of the crimes enumerated in those other treaties are recognized
under customary international law, 187 which is binding on all

180.
Bassiouni, supra note 175, at 44.
181.
Id. at 46. Professor Bassiouni argues that the establishment of a
permanent ICC having inherent jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes "would be the convincing argument" that these crimes are part of jus
cogens, and thus, obligations erga omnes to prosecute or extradite flow from them. Id.
155-56 (Dec. 10, 1998).
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1, § VI,
182.
The ILC stated in its commentary to draft Article 61 (Article'64 in the final text of the
Vienna Convention) in 1966 that "a rule of jus cogens is an overriding rule- depriving
any act or situation which is in conflict with it of legality." See LAURI HANNIKAINEN,
PEREMPTORY
NORMS (Jus COGENS)
IN
INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS 7 (1988).

LAW:

HISTORICAL

183.
Those other alternatives are prosecutions held at the national level by
virtue of universal and other forms of jurisdiction. See Elizabeth Benito, Justice for
Peace: No To Impunity, 14 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENAL 149, 152 (1998). Judge Benito
argued that the best solution for the problem of impunity is a creation of a Permanent
International Criminal Court. Thus, her view makes it clear that Resolution 1422 has a
direct impact on impunity.
Vienna Convention, supra note 135, art. 34.
184.
CASSESE, supra note 169, at 144. See also Furundzija,No. IT-95-17/1, § VI,
185.
154.
See infra note 187.
186.
187.
Mark A. Chenin, Game Theory And Customary International Law: A
Response To Professors GoldSmith And Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 143, 162-63 (2001).
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members of the international community regardless of whether those
members were parties to a specific treaty. According to Article 38 of
the Vienna Convention, "nothing . . .precludes a rule set forth in a
treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule
In light of this
of international law, recognized as such."18 8
conclusion, one could deduce that Resolution 1422 conflicts with both
a peremptory jus cogens norm and a customary rule of international
law.
The legal consequences of the above analysis may be best
delineated by the following opinion from Judge Lauterpacht:
[O]ne possibility is that, in strict logic, when the operation of paragraph
6 of Security Council resolution 713(1991) began to make Members of
the United Nations accessories to genocide, it ceased to be valid and
binding in its operation...; and that Members of the United Nations
189
then became free to disregard it.

See also Report of the Secretary General Under Security Council Resolution 808, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. 512504 (1993) [hereinafter Secretary General Report].
Professor Chenin quoted the U.N. Secretary General, who listed some of the treaties
that embody the abovementioned crimes and considered them as part of customary
international law, as follows: the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the
Protection of War Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of October 18, 1907; the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December
9, 1948; and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of August 8, 1945.
However, one might suggest adding the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984.
188.
Vienna Convention, supra note 135, art. 38.
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
189.
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bos. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia (Serb. & Mont.))
103 (Sept. 13) (separate
(Indication of Provisional Measures), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 441
However, Judge Lauterpacht raised another
Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht).
possibility, which he believes is more in accord with the realities of the situation. He
said,
It must be recognized that the chain of hypotheses in the analysis just made
involves some debatable link - elements of fact, such as that the arms embargo
has led to the imbalance in the possession of arms by the two sides and that
that imbalance has contributed in greater or lesser degree to genocidal activity
such as ethnic cleansing; and elements of law, such as that genocide is jus
cogens and that a resolution which becomes violative of jus cogens must then
become void and legally ineffective. It is not necessary for the Court to take a
position in this regard at this time. Instead, it would seem sufficient that the
relevance here of jus cogens should be drawn to the attention of the Security
council, as it will be by the required communication to it of the Court's Order,
so that the Security Council may give due weight to it in future reconsideration
While, of course, the principle thrust of a finding that
of the embargo ....
paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) may conflict with jus
cogens must lie in the direction of third states which may be willing to supply
arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina, that does not mean that such a conclusion could
have no place in an order operative between Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
present proceedings. There may well be advantage for Bosnia-Herzogevina (it is
not for the Court to determine) in being able to say that the Court had
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Based on Judge Lauterpacht's findings, Resolution 1422 ceases to be
valid and binding in operation because Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
Resolution make U.N. members accessories or contributors to the
commission of heinous crimes. Accordingly, Article 103 of the U.N.
Charter cannot come into play. 190 This conclusion arguably would
not be conceivable for those states that demanded adoption of
Resolution 1422.

VII.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING RESOLUTION

1422

Drafters of Resolution 1422 chose to finalize the document by
adding Paragraph 3, which states, "[Security Council Members]
[d]ecide[] that Member States shall take no action inconsistent with
The
Paragraph 1 and with their international obligations."'191
language of Paragraph 3 is broad, vague, and poses interesting legal
questions. For example, are 'Member States" limited to the Council's
current members, or are all the members of the United Nations
Second, what kinds of actions are inconsistent with
included?
Paragraph 1? Third, what is the implied meaning of the clause
"Member States shall take no action inconsistent . . . with their
international obligations" within the meaning of Paragraph 3?
Although there are no definite answers to these questions, an
analysis of the main purpose of the Resolution is instructive.
Regarding the meaning of the term "Member States," for example,
because the purpose of adopting Resolution 1422 was to limit the
ICC's jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states, it;is
inconceivable that the drafters were only referring to members of the
Council. The drafters of Resolution 1422 demanded that all U.N.
members comply with the Resolution, regardless of whether they

identified a source of doubt regarding the validity of the embargo resolution
which, though not directly operative by itself, requires that the Security
Council give the matter further consideration.
Id. at 441, 1 104, 106. In fact, it could be argued that in the case of Resolution 1422
the situation is different because that Resolution led directly to a violation of a jus
Moreover, if the second
cogens norm that the Council would have realized.
construction is the more effective one, why didn't the Council pay attention this time to
not overriding a peremptory norm? Judge Lauterpacht's separate opinion should have
been taken into account; regretfully, the Council proceeded in the same manner.
Id. at 440, T 100. However, Judge Lauterpacht in his separate opinion did
190.
not exclude Article 103 merely because of the invalidity of the Council's resolution, but
because jus cogens norms prevail in the case of a conflict, even with a Security Council
resolution. He expressed himself in the following words: "The relief which Article 103
of the Charter may give the Security Council in case of conflict between one of its
decisions and an operative treaty obligation cannot-as a matter of simple hierarchy of
norms-extend to a conflict between a Security Council resolution and jus cogens." Id.
S.C. Res. 1422, supra note 1.
191.
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were parties or non-parties to the ICC Statute. 192 Requiring all U.N.
members to comply with Resolution 1422 assures the highest
quantitative results of compliance and the effective application of
193
Paragraph 1 without any impediments.
Regarding the second and third questions, Paragraph 3 of
Resolution 1422 imposes a duty upon U.N. members not to take any
"action inconsistent" with Paragraph 1.194 A thorough reading of
Paragraph 3 suggests that its drafters desired to prevent states from
taking any steps that might hinder the very essence of Paragraph 1:
the ability to trigger the ICC's jurisdiction through the power of
195
referrals pursuant to Articles 13(a) and 14(a) of the ICC Statute.
Because initially all members of the United Nations are bound by the
Security Council's decisions, all U.N. members, whether parties or
non-parties to the ICC Statue, may have to refrain from cooperating
1
with the ICC. 96
Set aside the foregoing arguments and follow a different
approach to that taken throughout this Article thus far. Specifically,
use an analysis similar to the approach followed and intended by the
drafters of Resolution 1422. Assume that Resolution 1422 is valid, or
that states disregarded its invalidity and accepted its enforcement.
One may then suggest that the drafters believed that all U.N.
members should refrain from triggering an ICC proceeding or
cooperating with the ICC during a deferral period (indefinitely in this
situation) until the Council "decides otherwise." Moreover, the
drafters might have known that Article 16 does not allow a deferral
period of more than 12 months unless a new resolution has been
adopted that determines the same requirements of the original

Id.
192.
193.
However, it could be argued that there is no need for the inclusion of
paragraph 3 because, by virtue of Articles 2(5), 25 of the U.N. Charter, all Member
States are obliged to comply with the Security Council decisions, and give assistance to
any action the former takes. Nonetheless, it seems that the U.S.'s fear of facing any
critical situations with the ICC made the latter stress for such compliance through this
paragraph.
194.
S.C. Res. 1422, supra note 1, para. 3.
195.
Id. See also ICC Statute, supra note 8, arts. 13(a), 14(a).
See Giuseppe Nesi, The Obligation to Cooperate with the International
196.
Criminal Court and States not Party to the Statute, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 39 (ICRC et al. eds., 2002). However, in such a
situation there might arise conflicting obligations, on the one hand those arising as a
result of the Security Council decision, while on the other hand those arising from
other international treaties such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which imposed the
duty "to respect and ensure respect." Id. Although Article 103 of the U.N. Charter
says that the obligations arising from the Council prevail in terms of hierarchy of
treaties, the norms enshrined in those Convention, being part of customary
international law, makes it clear that the latter prevail and bind all states despite any
conflicting treaty provisions, including those set out in the U.N. Charter. Id. See also
Case Concerning the Military And Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
215-20 (June 27).
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 101-04,
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decision. Thus, two conflicting obligations arise: (1) the exact
interpretation of Article 16, which does not allow more than the 12
month period; and (2) the obligations arising from the U.N. Charter
to comply with the Security Council's decision.
Pursuant to Article 103 of the U.N. Charter, the obligation to
obey Security Council decisions prevails over all other obligations. As
a result, all U.N. Member States have to comply and refrain from
triggering proceedings before the Court or rendering cooperation until
the requested period has expired. It seems that the Security Council
wanted to achieve or reach such an inconceivable conclusion through
the above scenario. Nevertheless, while the above scenario is well
planned and grounded, after the initial 12-month deferral period, the
ICC does not have to refrain from proceeding with a situation or case
as a non-member to the U.N. Charter. 197 Pursuant to Articles 13(C)
and 15, the ICC prosecutor can still initiate investigations proprio
muto after the end of the initial 12-month deferral period. 198 The
prosecutor, therefore, can seek information from reliable sources,
such as inter- and non-governmental organizations that are not
barred from providing assistance under the Security Council's
decision.
In contrast, one may construe the first part of Paragraph 3 in a
different manner. When reading this part in light of Paragraph 1 of
Resolution 1422, one may reach a different conclusion. Paragraph 1
states, "[requests, consistent with the provisions of article 16 of the
Rome Statute ...

that the ICC, if a case arises ...

shall for a twelve-

month period starting [July 1, 2002] not commence or proceed ...
unless the Security Council decides otherwise." 199 Paragraph 3
states, "Members States shall take no action inconsistent with
paragraph 1. ' ' 200 From a literal reading of Paragraph 1, one might
infer that suspending the commencement of an investigation must be
"consistent with the provisions of article 16." In other words, the ICC
should not commence or proceed with an investigation or prosecution
only if the. requirements of Article 16 have been met. Because it has
been demonstrated previously that Paragraph 2 of the Resolution is
inconsistent with Article 16 of the ICC Statute, the ICC may not be
barred from beginning its investigations or continuing an ongoing
Based on this interpretation of
investigation or prosecution.
first
part of Paragraph 3, one could
Paragraph 1 and in light of the
argue that, if any Member State attempted to trigger proceedings

197.
Thus, one might suggest that the possibility of the above-mentioned
scenario is the reason for adding the first part of Paragraph 3-namely, to ensure that
if such a situation' arose, all states would be banned from assisting the Court.
198.
ICC Statute, supra note 8, arts. 13 (c), 15, 16.
199.
S.C. Res. 1422, supra note 1, para. 1.
Id. para. 3.
200.
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before the ICC, then that state would not be in violation of Resolution
1422 because this action would not be inconsistent with Paragraph 1.
The above-mentioned scenarios demonstrate that Resolution
1422 is ultra vires. Additionally, the Resolution might be disregarded
in order to overcome the diversity of its interpretation. Despite the
above-mentioned conclusions, Paragraph 3 still entails some technical
issues. The second part of Paragraph 3 requires that Member States
take no action inconsistent with Paragraph 1 and with their
international obligations. 20 1 Using the conjunction "and" to link the
two parts of Paragraph 3 suggests that the drafters intended to oblige
states with duties other than those arising from Paragraph 1.
Presumably, the drafters intended to reference Articles 24(1), 25,
and 103 of the U.N. Charter. This is to emphasize that all states
should comply with the letter of the Resolution, as embedded in
Paragraph 1. According to a broader construction, however, one could
construe the clause-"shall take no action inconsistent with
paragraph 1 and with their international obligations"-to mean that
any action taken should be consistent with the states' entire
international obligations. Some of those obligations are described 2in
02
various international instruments, including the U.N. Charter,
20 4
Apartheid
1949 Geneva Conventions, 20 3 Genocide Convention,
20 5 and Convention Against Torture. 20 6
Convention,

Id.
201.
202.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 1(3) ("The Purposes of the United Nations are ... [t]o
achieve international co-operation ... and in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights."), 55(3) ("[Tlhe United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for,
and observance of human rights."). Thus, according to these wordings, one might
wonder how such a resolution could be seen as observing human rights.
Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions imposes a duty on
203.
States to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. See
generally Frits Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in all
Circumstances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit, 2 Y.B. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3
(1999).
204.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Jan. 12, 1951, art. 1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 ("The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide,
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.").
The Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
205.
Apartheid, G.A. Res. 832, U.N. GAOR, art. 4 (Nov. 30, 1973) ("The States Parties to the
Present Convention undertake [ ] to adopt any legislative or other measures necessary
to suppress as well as to prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and
similar segregationist policies or their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of
that crime.").
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
206.
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at
197, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) ("Each State Party shall take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction."), reprinted in 23 I.L.M 1027 (1984), 24 I.L.M 535 (1985), 5
H.R.L.J. 350 (1984).
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The term "international obligations" is quite broad and embodies
all norms under public international law. 20 7 If the drafters desired to
benefit from obligations arising from Articles 24, 25, and 103 or the
common duty imposed by the previously cited conventions to repress
the heinous crimes in the domestic fora, then they overlooked the fact
that some of these international conventions impose a general duty
upon the states to "prevent" these crimes as well by all legal
means. 20 8 Hence, the following question remains: "How can accepting
Resolution 1422 prevent war crimes if the Resolution blocks the ICC's
jurisdiction while providing a clear signal to soldiers that they are
immune from standing trial?"
U.S. Representative John D. Negroponte's statement shows that
Resolution 1422 does more than block the ICC's jurisdiction. The
Resolution tolerates possible acts of genocide and war crimes
committed by U.S. soldiers. He stated:
[Pleacekeeping is one of the hardest jobs in the world. While we fully
expect our peacekeepers to act in accordance with established mandates
and in a lawful manner, peacekeepers can and do find themselves in
difficult, ambiguous situations. Peacekeepers from States that are not
.parties to the Rome Statute should not face, in addition to the dangers
and hardship of deployment, additional, unnecessary legal jeopardy. If
we want troop contributors to offer qualified military units to
peacekeeping operations, it is in the interest of all United Nations
Member States to ensure that they are not exposed to unnecessary
additional risks.209

The Statement expressed by Negroponte emphasizes that,
adoption of Resolution 1422 legitimized impunity for heinous crimes.
Its language highlights the exact intention behind the adoption of
this Resolution. The first target is to paralyze the ICC; the second is
to take no action, even at the national level. It follows from this
analysis that if national courts take no action against heinous crimes
then there is no other international judicial body that may prosecute
those acts even where the state is "unwilling" or "unable to carry out"
the proceedings within the meaning of Article 17 of the ICC
Statute. 210 In turn, Member States should not carry out the Security

Thus, it includes inter alia, custom and jus cogens, which, as mentioned
207.
previously, should not be overridden by this Resolution.
208.
U.N. CHARTER arts. 24, 25, 103. This argument suggests that the drafters
intended full compliance with the Resolution by virtue of Articles 24, 25, and 103
because the duty these Articles impose is part of the states "international obligations."
Meanwhile, although there is a common duty imposed by the aforementioned cited
conventions to repress these odious crimes at the domestic level, it should not be
forgotten, however, that some of these conventions impose another duty, wider in
scope, to "prevent" these crimes. Accordingly, the Council should consider all these
factors when adopting a decision of that type.
209.
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568, supra note 95.
210.
Inevitably, the ICTY has a limited time mandate. However, even if it is
competent to try future acts committed by UNMIBH, it would refrain from doing so
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Council's decision because the Resolution is contrary to the expressed
language of Paragraph 3, which requires that states' actions be
211
consistent with their international obligations.
Finally, set aside the legality of the Resolution and think about
its application. Under Paragraph 1, if a case involving current or
former officials developed, then the ICC shall "not commence or
proceed with [an] investigation or prosecution of any such case" for a
12-month period beginning July 1, 2002, unless the Security Council
decided otherwise. 212 The plain meaning permits one to conclude
that the Council used the term "case" within the technical meaning of
the ICC Statute in contrast to the word "situation."
On the other hand, an analytical reading might permit one to
argue that if a "case" did not arise, then the prosecutor is not barred
from commencing or proceeding with an investigation into a
situation. This is because the key requirement is a "case" and not a
"situation," which is a broader term. Therefore, the use of the term
"4case" permits the prosecutor to conduct a formal proceeding in two
instances even before a particular situation culminates into a "case"
per Article 19: (1) beyond the initiation of an investigation in
response to a referral, and (2) at a later stage than the questioning of
a suspect under Article 55, who is free from incarceration until a
situation is considered a "case. '213 Formal proceedings might include
an application for an arrest warrant under Article 58.214 *It seems

because it is politically controlled by the Security Council, unlike the ICC, which is aJ
separate institution. Accordingly, one might argue: why didn't the U.S. oppose the
creation of the ICTY as it has done with the ICC? One might suggest that the
foregoing words explain the reason.
211.
S.C. Res. 1422, supra note 1, para. 3.
212.
Id. para. 1.
213.
However, it could be argued that the reference to the term "case" appears
even at a very early stage under Article 15(4) of the Statute. Thus, the term mentioned
in the Resolution could refer to this stage. Nonetheless, one could counter that the PreTrial Chamber decision, pursuant to Article 15(4), to authorize the prosecutor to
commence an investigation proprio motu would not bring a case "before" the Court
within the meaning of Article 19(1), even though it mentions the word "case," because
the history and structure of Articles 13(c)' and 15 demonstrate that their purpose is to
permit the Prosecutor to investigate an entire "situation," not to make a definitive
decision whether an individual case is admissible. Under Article 15(4), the Pre-Trial
Chamber does not formally determine that a case "brought before it" is admissible, but
simply makes a determination "that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an
investigation" and that the case "appears" to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Accordingly, the aforementioned argument could go both ways. See Christopher K.
Hall, Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the Court or the Admissibility of a Case, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 10, at 407, 408 n.8 (emphasis added)
(text mistakenly refers to Article 15(3) instead of 15(4)).
214.
El Zeidy, supra note 128. Obviously, the aforementioned argument or
conclusion could be countered and reversed as seen in the preceding footnote. It could
be further argued that what is meant by the term "case" in the Resolution is a
"situation," because the Resolution "requests the non commencement of an
investigation," and the latter does not arise except at the very early stage of the
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that the political desire to adopt the Resolution led to its legal
dilemmas on one hand, and its inconsistency with the main principles
of international law on the other.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Proponents of Resolution 1422, particularly the United States,
desired to compromise and override international justice by granting
its leaders and soldiers blanket immunities. Although the United
States tried to defend its position, the United States did not succeed
in convincing the international community. Unfortunately,
Negroponte's assertions made during the 4568th meeting do not
justify, and in fact condemn, the U.S. position.
Some of the U.S.'s fears that were not officially disclosed by its
representative have been thoroughly discussed and remedied through
the meetings by other state representatives. One such fear is how the
ICC impinges upon on the rights of third-party states.2 15 Yet a
thorough reading of the classical basis of jurisdiction demonstrates
that the ICC is based on the classical forms of jurisdiction. In
particular, those forms of jurisdiction are based on territoriality and
active personality, which any state can exercise even in interstate
2 16
relations.
In addition, it should not be forgotten that some of these crimes
have been codified in treaties that render part of customary
international law.2 17 The ICC Statute mirrors the very essence of
those treaty provisions, thus binding all states, including non-party
states, to those provisions. The fact that those crimes are jus cogens
makes it clear that every state has a duty to prevent those crimes and
to punish those who commit them.
Some commentators presume that the United States fears
arbitrary prosecutions by the ICC. This presumption is true, but, only
when the ICC operates as the court of first resort. The ICC is based
on the principle of "complementarity" and it does not involve itself in
a particular case untilthe national court proves that it is unwilling or
unable to fulfill its duties. 2 18 Yet it is hardly imaginable that any
state acting in a bona fide manner would face this situation.

proceedings even before the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber. However, the
argument demonstrates one of the legal problems of the Resolution's formulation.
215.
See, e.g., U.N. Doc S/PV.4568, supra note 95.
216.
For a thorough discussion on the basis of jurisdiction, see Christopher L.
Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW:
PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 33-70 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed.
1999); BASSIOUNI, supra note 172, at 295-312.
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See Chenin, supra note 187; Secretary General Report, supra note 1871, at
33, 5.
218.
El Zeidy, supra note 128.
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Additionally, Article 17 of the ICC Statute sets detailed criteria on
how the ICC may begin an assessment on a case. Pursuant to
Articles 18 and 19, states can challenge the admissibility of an
investigation or a case in the hands of the ICC so as not to make the
ICC's jurisdiction arbitrary.
The main problem, however, goes beyond the U.S.'s position.
Resolution 1422 does more than frustrate the ICC's ability to function
properly; it conflicts with international law principles engrained in
the U.N. Charter, the Law of Treaties, and certain customary and
peremptory norms.
Nevertheless, one might conclude that the
Resolution may cease to have legal effects.
Though various
constructions may have produced different interpretations of the
Resolution, there remains one common conclusion: the Resolution
should cease to have effect because it is incongruous and contradicts
major principles of international law. The legal arguments of some
scholars that the practical legal effects of Resolution 1422 are not
extremely dangerous because the Court still has the final assessment,
do not, however, reduce the drastic negative impact of the
aforementioned Resolution on the precepts and principles of
international law. Resolution 1422, therefore, is a significant,
harmful compromise to international law. Under this Resolution, it
seems that politics can override law whenever the situation demands.

